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U.S. COMMITTEE 
FOR REFUGEES 
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 701 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Tel: (202) 347-3507 Fax: (202) 347-3418 
Site Visit Notes 
Rwandan Refugees: 
Updated Findings and Recommendations 
October 25, 1995 
by Jeff Drumtra 
U.S. Committee for Refugees 
Following are selected findings and policy recommendations by the U.S. Committee for 
Refugees (USCR) pertaining to the Rwandan refugee situation. These are based on USCR's two-
week site visit to Rwanda and eastern Zaire between September 18 and October 2, 1995~ USCR 
has conducted ten site visits to the region since April 1994 and monitors the region on an ongoing 
basis. 
USCR' s most recent site visit examined three general issues in Goma, Zaire: 
- the seriousness of Zaire's threat to expel all refugees by year's end; 
- conditions and changing dynamics in the refugee camps; 
- levels of intimidation, propaganda, and information in the camps. 
USCR assessed four general issues inside Rwanda: 
- current settlement patterns inside Rwanda; 
- security in Rwanda, especially for returnees; 
- Rwanda's capacity for refugee repatriation and resettlement; 
- permanent resettlement of "old caseload" Tutsi refugees. 
These USCR Site Visit Notes are organized around these seven issues. This summary 
assumes that readers possess a working knowledge of the Rwanda refugee situation. It is hoped 
that policymakers and NGO officials will find the format of this summary useful for decision-
making and analysis. 
USCR, a private, humanitarian agency, has been informing the public since 1958. 

Part 1 - Goma Refugee Camps 
• Zaire gives mixed signals about the seriousness of its threat to expel all 
refugees by year's end. 
Zaire expelled 13,000 refugees in August and insists that its December 31 deadline is 
serious. During USCR' s site visit, Zairean officials were verbally pressuring the refugee 
population by announcing restrictions on refugee employment and housing outside the camps. By 
·all accounts, average Zaireans in the area are increasingly discontented with the refugees' presence. 
At its recent Tripartite Meeting with Rwanda and UNHCR, Zaire indicated its readiness to arrest 
former Rwandan leaders who are impeding repatriation. 
During USCR's site visit, the governor of North Kivu addressed refugees in Mugunga 
camp and firmly insisted that they return home. The governor threatened to arrest persons 
spreading propaganda in the camps and chided the refugees for their steadfast loyalty to discredited 
leaders who lost the civil war last year. 
On the other hand, Zaire has rarely implemented similar threats. Zairean officials have 
previously announced restrictions on refugees' housing and employment without taking action. 
Zaire's forcible expulsion in August conspicuously did not target the former Rwandan military 
(FAR), militia members, or other leaders who impede refugee repatriation. Many Zairean officials 
presumably retain close ties to Rwanda's exiled former leaders, who resist repatriation of the 
refugees. Zaire's forcible expulsion exercise in August appeared to be intentionally limited in 
scope, according to many observers in Goma interviewed by USCR. 
Important individuals in Zaire's government, armed services, and economy benefit from 
the refugees' presence. Many observers suspect Zaire's expulsion threat is little more than an 
attempt by Mobutu to extract political and financial concessions from the international community 
on other matters. 
Zaire's ultimate actions toward the refugees will depend on internal Zairean politics and the 
complicated power struggles among the country's civilian authorities as well as among competing 
branches of the police and military. Zaire's government is far from monolithic, and outsiders have 
difficulty deciphering the competing interests. 
< Recommendation # 1 > Take seriously the Zaire government's threat to forcibly expel all 
refugees by the end of 1995. 
Given the chaos and probable violence that massive forcible repatriation would trigger 
inside Rwanda, the world cannot afford to shrug off Zaire's expulsion threat, despite uncertainty 
about the threat's validity. Relief agencies and international diplomats would be wise to assume 
that forcible expulsion is likely to occur and should pursue strategies to avert it or alleviate its 
destabilizing impact inside Rwanda. Massive forced repatriation would be violent; significant 
voluntary repatriation is necessary. 
< Recommendation #2 > UNHCR should encourage larger voluntary repatriation in an 
effort to preempt precipitous action by Zairean authorities. 
UNHCR officials in Goma and Rwanda believe that a steady, organized flow of about 
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< Recommendation #4 > UNHCR/Goma should clearly explain its aggressive repatriation 
strategy to NGOs working in Goma refugee camps. NGOs should cooperate with 
UNHCR's strategy. 
Many NGOs operating in Goma appear to be confused about UNHCR' s aggressive 
repatriation strategy. Some who understand the strategy apparently oppose it. 
Some NGOs, for example, continue camp improvement projects and resist UNHCR 
pressure to curtail the hiring of refugee employees. Many NGOs are likely to resist publicly any 
restrictions placed on camp refugees. Curtailment of refugee services runs counter to NGOs' 
usual humanitarian impulse. In addition, NGO/Goma workers--like the refugees themselves--
suffer from a severe lack of accurate information about conditions inside Rwanda. 
The level of distrust between UNHCR/Goma and many NGOs could potentially 
undermine UNHCR' s repatriation strategy by sending contradictory messages to the refugee 
community. UNHCR/Goma should more effectively communicate its strategy and tactics to 
NGOs. NGOs should commit to supporting the strategy of aggressive voluntary repatriation if it 
is implemented properly. 
< Recommendation #5 > More NGOs in Goma should make a concerted effort to 
eliminate suspected murderers from their payrolls. 
Some relief agencies make a good-faith effort to screen their ·refugee employees to 
eliminate undesirables. Too many international NGOs in Goma, however, continue to employ 
Rwandan individuals who are strongly suspected of participating in last year's mass murder. This 
is ethically unacceptable. Relief agencies should make a good-faith effort to screen their camp 
employees in order to ensure that the employees are drawn from the hundreds of thousands of 
innocent Rwandan refugees. New hires as well as existing employees should be properly 
screened. 
Such screening admittedly takes time, places an added burden on relief directors, 
complicates the hiring process, and exposes NGOs to potential retaliation. More NGOs should 
screen their workers despite these difficulties. In many instances, the genocide participants are 
well-known and easily identified. Relief agencies should regard employee screening as a required 
financial and logistical cost of operating in the Goma camps. 
< Recommendation #6 > NGOs should provide a proper historical orientation to new 
expatriate staff working in the Rwanda region. NGOs should oblige all expatriate staff to 
read the Mrican Rights report, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, as a prerequisite for 
working in the region. 
Given the short-term contracts and rapid staff rotations common in overseas relief work, 
many NGO staff in Goma and in Rwanda are new to the region and lack a full understanding of 
the historical and political context in which they are working. The genocide, and its lingering 
repercussions, make the situation in this region unique. Agencies and their workers have a special 
responsibility to understand it. 
USCR recommends the African Rights report, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, as 
obligatory reading for any individual or organization attempting to play a constructive role in the 
Rwanda region. The report can be purchased from African Rights in London. Phone 011-171-
717-1224; fax 011-171-717-1240. 
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Sixthly, status quo negligible repatriation. Perhaps UNHCR's aggressive voluntary 
repatriation strategy will fail. Perhaps Zairean authorities ~ill ign?re their own repa~ation_ 
ultimatum to the refugees. Perhaps international donors will continue to fund camps In Zrure at a 
cost of $1 million per day. This scenario would prolong the overall crisis with no sign of 
progress, maintain the power base of a genocidal regime, and sustain regional instability. 
< Recommendation #7 > Organized voluntary repatriation is the preferred option. It can 
only be stimulated by aggressive tactics. 
It should be acknowledged that this option has drawbacks. Many humanitarians are 
uncomfortable with the notion of "getting tough" with refugees. The "get tough" strategy pushes 
the line between voluntary and involuntary repatriation. If the strategy successfully stimulates 
repatriation, it will likely provoke new problems inside Rwanda as a traumatized Rwandan society 
absorbs large numbers of returnees. 
These concerns, however, are more acceptable than other, more dangerous options outlined 
above. Nudging the Rwandan refugee situation toward a difficult but constructive resolution will 
require patience and determination by the international community. In post-genocide Rwanda, 
nothing is easy. 
• Many Rwandan refugees in Zaire now openly consider the prospects for 
repatriation. This is a significant change. 
Zaire's forcible expulsion exercise in August and its threat to expel all refugees in the near 
future have changed camp dynamics. More refugees now discuss openly the pros and cons of 
returning to Rwanda, and are more openly inquisitive about conditions there. The camp taboo 
against discussing repatriation has been broken, at least for the time being. 
This change in mindset, however, has not yet produced more voluntary repatriation. 
• The refugee population is not monolithic. At least four mindsets exist 
about repatriation. 
The refugees fled to Zaire together last year and have remained in Zaire together for more 
than a year. It is therefore easy for outsiders to mistakenly assume that the refugee population is 
monolithic in thought as well as in deed. It is not, particularly in recent months. 
One group in the camps are criminals, guilty of participating in last year's genocide. As 
criminals, they are not bona-fide refugees under international law and should not be treated as 
such. Given their own guilt, they will probably choose never to participate in any repatriation 
program. A reasonable estimate is that 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandans in Zaire and Tanzania may 
never repatriate, due to their guilt or their family ties to a guilty individual. 
A second group are hardliners who are not guilty of genocide. They are, however, 
vehemently opposed to the RP A and believe all propaganda disseminated by the exiled genocide 
leaders. 
A third group are average refugees who are only now beginning to consider repatriation. 
They tend to trust--or at least follow-their extremist leaders, but are now less sure. They are 
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scars-vivid and effective propaganda about the alleged danger of repatriation. Investigation by 
UNHCR subsequently revealed that the two individuals had never entered Rwanda. 
The exiled regime remains a world-class propagandist. Many NGO workers in the camps 
are susceptible to the propaganda as well, because they often lack alternative channels of 
information about events in Rwanda. 
• Positive steps inside Rwanda are often interpreted negatively by the 
refugees, due to camp propaganda and inbred suspicions. 
Many refugees refuse to believe any positive news about developments 'in Rwanda. This 
resistance is due to the relentlessly negative propaganda refugees hear in camps, as well as their 
own inbred suspicions about the RP A after four years of civil war. 
In conversations with USCR, some refugees refused to believe that Rwanda was relatively 
calm at this time. They insisted that positive letters reaching the camps from returnees were forged 
by the RP A and that the returnees themselves were probably dead. The fact that some returnees are 
finding relative safety in Rwanda is, according to many refugees, merely a ploy by the RPA to 
draw Hutu back "little by little" in order to slaughter them all. Some refugees charged that the 
construction of new prisons in Rwanda to alleviate prison overcrowding was proof that the RP A 
plans to arrest all Hutu. They insisted that positive feedback from camp residents who have made 
"go-and-see" visits into Rwanda are not credible because such visits are easily manipulated by 
Rwanda's government. 
This reaction indicates that continued progress inside Rwanda, while important, probably 
cannot by itself stimulate large-scale repatriation. An information campaign is required to 
counteract the sophisticated propaganda of the exiled regime. 
• Refugees do have several valid concerns about returning to Rwanda. Not 
all fears are due to propaganda misinformation. 
Although many refugees' worst fears are without basis, some fears are valid. Refugees are 
well-informed about Rwanda's overcrowded prisons. They have legitimate concerns that a 
wrongful arrest could be fatal due to appalling prison conditions. They also have reasonable 
concerns about how quickly they can reclaim their land if squatters refuse to vacate. 
Refugees' fears regarding land disputes are often greater than their concerns about security, 
some relief workers told USCR. In other words, widespread fear and confusion about the land 
adjudication system may be the most significant deterrent to repatriation, in many cases. 
< Recommendation # 10 > Launch a sophisticated and relentless mass information 
campaign to give refugees a fuller picture of conditions in Rwanda. 
In this refugee situation more than most, information is key. A battle is underway for the 
hearts and minds of 1.8 million Rwandan Hutu refugees. The battle has been one-sided. The 
impressive propaganda skills of the exiled regime sparked the murder of up to 1 million persons 
and helped persuade nearly 2 million refugees to flee Rwanda. Those same propaganda skills are 
now helping perpetuate a refugee crisis and regional instability. Information versus 
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< Recommendation # 14 > Provide detailed information describing how refugees reclaim 
their land if it is occupied upon their return. 
The government of Rwanda has said repeatedly that refugees retain ownership of their 
land. To the extent this message has reached refugees, it is still insufficient information. Refugees 
want to know how the policy is being implemented. They want to know, in detail, exactly where 
they should file a claim if their land is occupied by squatters upon their return. They want to know 
how long the process requires them to wait before they can regain possession of their occupied 
land and homes. They want to know what temporary accommodations and other security are 
available while they await their land. Refugees interested in repatriating hesititate to make a final 
decision because they cannot find answers to these detailed questions; 
An information campaign on radio and via camp meetings should provide this information 
repeatedly. In addition, refugees need to hear the first -hand stories of returnees who have regained 
their land. 
< Recommendation # 15 > Enable more refugees to conduct "go-and-see" visits to Rwanda 
to collect first-hand information about conditions. 
The governments of Rwanda and Zaire should give higher priority to facilitating so-called 
"go-and-see" visits that allow refugees to visit temporarily their home areas of Rwanda. 
Information-collection visits are a basic tool proven effective in facilitating refugee repatriations 
around the world. Rwandan refugees have been unable to make such scouting trips regularly due 
to restrictions by Rwandan and Zairean authorities. 
< Recommendation #16 > The Rwandan government and RPA should allow personal 
letters to pass unimpeded between refugee camps and the interior of Rwanda. 
The Rwandan government and RPA should allow private letters to pass easily between 
refugee camps and the interior of Rwanda. Currently such mail is screened and, at times, 
confiscated by Rwandan authorities. The benefits of allowing information to cross the border 
outweigh the Rwandan government's security concerns. 
Letters between refugees and returnees are potentially a rich source of information for 
refugees seeking alternative information about conditions in Rwanda. Restrictions on these letters 
have reduced the flow of information to refugees and leads refugees to conclude that Rwandan 
authorities are hiding the true conditions in their country. 
< Recommendation # 17 > Provide intensive information on alternative radio broadcasts 
into the Goma camps. 
Rwandan refugees, as most African refugees, are avid radio listeners. UNHCR/Goma 
only recently has begun to collaborate with Radio Agatashya, an independent station, to provide 
information to refugees in Goma. Rwandan government radio is also available. These and any 
other available radio broadcasts should provide more intensive information to refugees about 
conditions in Rwanda, daily human rights and security updates region-by-region, news about 
specific relief and development projects underway in Rwanda, etc. The daily information provided 
to refugees via these broadcasts should be exhaustive, in an effort to erode gradually the powerful 
negative propaganda assaulting refugees in the camps. 
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Such information would address the natural curiosity and concern that expatriate workers have for 
their former employees, and would provide useful information to refugees contemplating the risks 
of their own return. Refugees employed by NGOs are often influential in refugee camps, and 
news about their safe return to Rwanda could influence other refugees. 
< Recommendation #21 > Exploit the fact that Goma' s refugee camps are organized 
according to communes and sectors--it is therefore easy to provide commune-specific 
information directly to refugees from a given commune. 
Refugees can benefit from general information about Rwanda, but detailed information 
about conditions in their home .commune or home sector is most influential. The highly organized 
structure of the refugee camps by home commune should facilitate bringing commune-specific 
information directly to the appropriate refugees. 
Refugees should receive weekly reports about life in their home communes, including 
information about relief projects, development projects, human rights monitoring, crop production, 
etc. Collecting and disseminating this information requires proper collaboration between 
UNHCR/Rwanda and UNHCR/Goma. 
• Health conditions among refugees in Goma are excellent. Malnutrition is 
negligible. Birth rates have returned to 90% of normal Rwandan levels. 
UNHCR and relief organizations have accomplished a remarkable logistical and 
humanitarian feat in the Goma refugee camps despite the unfavorable terrain. Camps that were 
thought to be ''unsustainable" have been sustained. The question is whether international donors 
will remain willing to support the massive camps without some progress toward resolution. 
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shape refugees' impressions about tensions and poor security in the rest of Rwanda. The 
pervasive presence of RP A troops in border areas--posted there for understandable security 
reasons--aggravates refugees' concerns that they are unwelcome in Rwanda. 
< Recommendation #22 > Train RP A troops to receive large numbers of returnees. 
The government of Rwanda, with international assistance, should provide special training 
to RP A soldiers posted in border areas to prepare them to deal properly with large numbers of 
civilian returnees. Training should range from human rights to proper crowd control techniques. 
• Rwanda is a traumatized, post-genocide society that will likely remain 
traumatized for years or decades into the future. 
Rwanda's genocide continues to reverberate through Rwandan society. Fortunately for the 
world--but unfortunately for Rwanda--the world has only limited experience dealing with the 
legacy of genocide. As a traumatized society, Rwanda will likely experience revenge killings, 
violent land disputes, paranoia, and deep mistrust for years to come. Proper policies by the 
Rwandan government can alleviate the instability, but probably cannot eliminate it altogether. 
Similarly, proper repatriation programs can gradually make refugee return and resettlement 
possible, but ironclad guarantees of safety for absolutely all returnees are impossible. · 
< Recommendation #23 > The U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance should remain 
prepared for a possible new round of humanitarian emergency in Rwanda. 
The relative calm inside Rwanda, coupled with OFDA's worldwide budget constraints, has 
virtually ended OFDA operations in the country. Significant repatriation could, however, propel 
Rwandan society into new stresses warranting quick OFDA reaction. Forcible expulsion of the 
refugees by Zaire would almost certainly trigger a humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, as would a 
massive "voluntary" return of refugees under the direction of FAR and the old regime. 
< Recommendation #24 > Continue training a national police force that would reduce the 
RPA's policing responsibilities. 
The RP A is trained as an army, not as a police force. Its continued involvement in 
domestic police work is a prescription for human rights problems and political concerns. 
International donors are making progress in helping Rwanda establish a police force. This should 
continue to be a priority in a country where post-genocide disputes over property, restitution, and 
ethnic tensions will be common for years. 
• Rwanda currently is sufficiently safe for refugee repatriation, according to 
UNHCR/Rwanda. 
UNHCR/Rwanda cites several criteria to explain its recent decision to encourage voluntary 
refugee repatriation to Rwanda Until recent weeks UNHCR had facilitated repatriation to Rwanda 
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analytical capacity is weak, however, and is therefore less useful than it co~ld be. . . 
Proper computer mapping and staff support would enable human nghts officials In the 
country to analyze whether security incidents occur more frequently in border areas than 
elsewhere; whether atrocities tend to occur immediately after infiltrations by FAR; whether 
abuses tend to occur immediately prior to RP A troop rotations; whether security incidents rise 
when local repatriation reaches a certain threshhold; whether atrocities decline when local schools 
open, etc. 
This type of correlative analysis creates opportunities for preventive actions. The Rwandan 
government, the UN, international donors, and assistance agencies all would benefit from the 
insights generated by this type of sophisticated, constructive analysis. 
< Recommendation #28 > Make safer the new border crossing between the Goma camps 
and the Gisenyi region, located at Mutovu. 
UNHCR and the Rwandan government have attempted to encourage refugee repatriation 
by opening a new border crossing at Mutovu, six kilometers from Zaire's Kibumbu refugee 
camp. USCR visited the crossing point. Fewer than 20 refugees had returned via the Mutovu 
crossing. 
One problem was that refugees wishing to cross at Mutovu could arrive there only after 
walking six kilometers through the bush, where they were vulnerable to potential ambush by 
Interahamwe, RP A, or bandits. In addition, RP A troops were reportedly threatening to limit the 
number of returnees to 150 per day and were threatening to shoot any returnees who strayed from 
the footpath. Roads from the border crossing to a reception center 10 miles away would be almost 
impassable for large vehicles in rainy season. 
UNHCRIR wanda and UNHCR/Goma should collaborate to provide transportation or 
escorts for refugees wanting to repatriate via Mutovu crossing. UNHCR/Rwanda should improve 
the road to the border crossing. Rwandan authorities should ensure that no artificial limits are 
placed on the number of returnees at Mutovu and should instruct RP A troops that returnees are not 
targets of war. 
• The permanent resettlement of "old caseload" Tutsi returnees is 
proceeding slowly. 
The Rwandan government estimates that 750,000 "old caseload" Tutsi have returned to 
Rwanda Approximately half of them are believed to inhabit towns, and half are believed to live in 
rural areas. The exact number of Tutsi returnees who have resettled permanently on their own land 
is unclear, but appears to be no more than 20 percent. This means that more than a half-million 
Tutsi returnees remain effectively internally displaced, not yet settled on land they can call their 
own. 
The government is attempting to resettle large numbers of Tutsi returnees in the extreme 
northeast (including in Akagera Park), in the Kibungo prefecture in southeast Rwanda, and in 
northwest Rwanda between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. The government and UNHCR offer different 
assessments of the sustainable population capacities in these areas. UNHCR and the government 
also disagree on the proper sequence of assistance: Rwandan officials complain that, in the 
northeast, UNHCR has not provided water and other services that might attract families to 
designated resettlement areas that remain empty; UNHCR says that it cannot provide services 
16 

< Recommendation #30 > International donors should continue to accelerate their 
disbursement of pledged monies. 
Slow reaction has characterized the international community's response to Rwanda during 
the past two years. One key to Rwanda's refugee problem is to stabilize the situation inside 
Rwanda, yet international financial assistance has been painfully slow to arrive. A top official at 
the U.S. Agency for International Development noted in September that he has "never witnessed a 
situation whereby the international community, for all intents and purposes, has marginalized a 
government" to the extent it has in Rwanda. 
Only in recent months have donor disbursements accelerated. The current disbursement 
total is five times larger than in May, three times larger than in July. It is true that an infusion of 
too much money too quickly can create new problems, but that does not yet appear to be a 
problem in this case. The government of Rwanda suffers from a "profound lack of capacity" after 
the genocide and refugee flight, according to Randolph Kent, the UN' s Humanitarian Coordinator 
in Kigali. International donors should honor the financial commitments they have made in a 
timely manner. 
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